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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to examine the relationship between 
central and local approaches to transitional justice in post-
conflict situations. It is found that these two levels are not 
as ‘neat’ as some may suggest, and actors from both 
levels behave in ways more commonly attributed to the 
other level. By thinking of them in dynamic and 
behavioral rather than static and spatial terms, the 
(inter)relationship might be better understood. This is 
important as transitional justice is increasingly employed 
and local approaches (sometimes uncritically) are sought 
after. 
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INTRODUCTION 
‘Local’ methods to moving out of conflict and promoting 
reconciliation (in contrast to centrally-organized methods) 
have been of particular interest to scholars in transitional 
justice. (Hughes et al 2015) They have been critical of 
their discipline and the directions in which it may be 
going, and thus as the ‘local’ receives more mention (and 
praise), its relationship with the central level must also be 
examined in order to better understand each approach and 
how they interact. 
This paper seeks to examine how central and local 
approaches to transitional justice might be employed in 
post-conflict situations. The paper briefly sets an 
overview of the goals of transitional justice as a 
foundation. It then turns to its main question and defines 
the terms ‘central’ and ‘local’. This is more complicated 
than it seems, as the lines between the different levels are 
often confused and each is often defined in relation to the 
other. Once the terms have been elucidated upon, a 
description of how these approaches work can be given, 
including their benefits and drawbacks. After an 
examination of police reform in post-conflict Northern 
Ireland, conclusions are be drawn about their relationship. 
It is unfortunately not within the scope of this paper to 
discuss the international level, but this paper does 
acknowledge its increasing importance in transitional 
justice, especially in the globalized era. (Rhot-Arriaza 
2010; Sharp 2014; Teitel 2002) 
1. GOALS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
When occurring in a transition from armed conflict, the 
goals of transitional justice are both to find some kind of 
truth behind crimes committed during armed conflict, and 
to restore a lasting peace. Eisikovits calls this the “central 
and definitive tension” at stake in transitional contexts. 
(Eisikovits 2014) Peace here does not mean merely the 
significant reduction of violence, but also reconciliation. 
For this to emerge, it is often argued that the underlying 
sources of the conflict must be addressed. Calls for justice 
in such contexts thus also tend to come with calls for 
establishing a comprehensive truth that details “what 
happened, how, why, and what the sources of 
responsibility are.” (Bassiouni 2002) 
Bassiouni outlines the two outlooks of transitional justice. 
On the one side, it looks to the past by reflecting on and 
illuminating the nature of the violations that took place, 
and holding to account the individuals responsible for 
those violations. On the other side, it looks to the future 
by rebuilding the systems that failed to protect many 
citizens during the period of extensive violence, and more 
generally by creating a stable peace in those societies 
marked by conflict. (Bassiouni 2002) Transitional justice 
mechanisms could be seen as obstacles to reconciliation, 
because they were charged with investigating violent and 
divisive histories which might “interfer[e] with a forward-
looking political change.” (Leebaw 2008) It is also 
possible, however, that reconciliation will not happen if 
there is no accountability for massive human rights 
abuses, thus hampering the likelihood of a lasting peace. 
This tension is especially difficult in some transitional 
societies in which “the traditions and institutions so 
important for navigating these questions are not yet 
present,” the way they are in contexts where ordinary 
justice is being employed. Simply trying to create or 
rebuild these institutions in turn “creates situations where 
peace and justice must clash.” (Eisikovits 2014) 
With this foundational understanding of the goals of 
transitional justice we can begin to examine the local and 
central approaches to fulfilling these goals. 
2. THE ‘LOCAL’ 
In the past 15 years, ‘the local’ in post conflict discourse 
has become more fashionable with both theorists and 
practitioners. (Hughes et al 2015, MacGinty 2015) The 
state is no longer the primary viewpoint to understand 
conflict, as it was in most of the 20th century; instead of 
state institutions, social forces are being recognized as a 
key component in conflict analysis and peacebuilding. 
(MacGinty 2015) Originally, discussions about 
transitional justice were based on a state-centric approach 
to promoting accountability, truth seeking, or other means 
of addressing the serious violations of human rights 
committed by an authoritarian regime. The state or the 
new regime was thus seen as the main authority in 
making transitional justice decisions. (Obel Hansen 2014, 
Teitel, 2002) From the 1990s onwards, however, 
transitional justice methods have also been applied in 
more diverse contexts. The field has thus become 
associated with statebuilding and peacebuilding, in 
addition to democratization, reform, and the rule of law. 
(Teitel 2002) Civil society and international actors have 
more input and relevance in transitional justice decision-
making, both in theory and practice; the state is now only 
one of the actors who have a stake in shaping transitional 
policy. (Obel Hansen 2014) 
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It is generally understood that the transitional justice 
‘toolkit’ cannot be applied in the same way in different 
legal and political cultures, and its mechanisms cannot 
work without participation and ‘ownership’ by the 
inhabitants of the country concerned. (Waldorf 2016) 
MacGinty outlines some of the benefits of the ‘local 
approach’ for development and peacebuilding 
practitioners, the most important being access to and 
legitimacy with the people with whom they are working. 
(MacGinty 2015) In addition, when enabling local 
ownership, transitional justice is said be more responsive 
to the needs of both victims and the larger society, and can 
take their values, institutions, and practices more 
seriously. Overall, this would help (re-)establish norms of 
what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the 
society, based on a broad participation in the process of 
clarifying those norms. (Clamp and Doak 2012) This may 
also yield an increased understanding of the harms 
committed, and more broadly of the different parties to 
the conflict. Furthermore, Orentlicher explains that the 
participation of victims and other citizens in the process 
of designing as well as implementing transitional justice 
programs “helps ensure that policies for combating 
impunity effectively respond to victims’ actual needs and, 
in itself, ‘can help reconstitute the full civic membership 
of those who were denied the protection of the law in the 
past,’” which is key to fulfilling the needs of victims and 
societal reconciliation. (Orentlicher 2007) This also might 
give the transitional justice mechanisms employed a 
greater legitimacy than if they had only been coordinated 
centrally. (Waldorf 2016) 
3. THE ‘CENTRAL’ 
That being said, relying too much on a local approach is 
ineffective and could undermine the goals of transitional 
justice. Local leaders may have an interest in covering up 
the crimes for which they are responsible, ignoring the 
needs of victims, or using methods that are in conflict 
with international human rights norms. (Sharp 2014) As 
they have an interest in maintaining their position, there is 
also a concern that local elites will abuse the rhetoric of 
local ownership to reinforce oppressive power structures. 
(Lundy 2011, Orentlicher 2007) A heavy reliance on the 
local approach may thus lead to recreating the same 
exclusive and discriminatory structures that fueled the 
conflict in the first place. Furthermore, local participation 
does not automatically give legitimacy to the transitional 
justice mechanisms being employed. A central-level 
approach can allow actors to use their greater resources 
and expand the transitional process over time. (Thoms et 
al 2010) 
Certain reforms are already situated at the central level, 
such as prisons, police, or the judiciary, as well as ending 
exclusionary formal practices affecting marginalized and 
resentful groups. The central level will have an especially 
important role if the state was the source of violence or 
human rights abuses; they will have a particular 
responsibility in establishing the line between the old and 
new regime. (Rhot-Arriaza 2010) Additionally, central 
approaches might be more likely to have the resources 
and access to take a larger, more holistic, multi-
mechanism approach. Conflicts which are divisive, also in 
territorial terms, will require justice which involves the 
meeting of people from different regions who were pitted 
against each other during the conflict. They will need to 
hear each other’s stories, so as to reduce power of their 
collective identities and build bridges across divisions. 
Aiken 2014) As Thoms, Ron, and Paris—citing Long and 
Brecke—explain, “‘extensive truth telling is the critical 
starting point for successful peace settlements… 
Successful reconciliation, the authors find, is a protracted 
and complex process that includes truth telling, identity 
r e d e f i n i t i o n a n d ‘ p a r t i a l j u s t i c e s h o r t o f 
revenge.’” (Thoms et al 2010) This is more feasible on a 
larger, country-level scale, as the resources for such 
mechanisms may be more readily available and 
combinations of mechanisms can be better monitored. 
Studies by Call, by Snyder and Vinjamuri, and by Lie et 
al. also note that in countries which already have (or are 
on their way toward having) a democracy, the central 
level already has a great deal of credibility and will be 
able to legitimately implement transitional justice policy 
by allowing parliament to vote on bills by and facilitating 
country-wide consultations. (Thoms et al 2010) 
A state might also have a better ability to oversee how the 
different mechanisms work together, and in this sense 
make decisions about which are appropriate or necessary 
for the overall process. (Thoms et al 2010) Having a 
central approach can help provide an overview of what 
efforts are being made in a country, which makes it easier 
to coordinate, organize, and monitor various local efforts. 
Actors at different levels have different and varied 
experiences with designing and implementing transitional 
justice policies, and will have unique insights to offer. 
Different actors can also make up for each others’ faults, 
for example local elites may be unable to cover up crimes 
if civil society organizations are there to vouch for 
accountability. (Obel Hansen 2014, Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2002) Fletcher and Weinstein also note the 
importance of an organized overall strategy, arguing that, 
“piecemeal approaches that involve separate agencies 
attempting to change different components of a system 
are doomed to failure” if they are not coordinated. 
(Fletcher and Weinstein 2002) Thus, a central strategy 
can be useful for overseeing how different local 
operations interact, and make adjustments as needed. 
(Rhot-Arriaza 2010) 
4. ROMANTICIZING THE LOCAL 
The popularity or fashionableness of the ‘local turn’ in 
literature seems to have allowed scholars to rely on over-
simplified definitions of ‘the local’. Furthermore, it can 
tend to make them under-critical of such an approach, or 
at least overlook some of the benefits of a central-
approach. (MacGinty 2015) The literature sometimes 
defines the local as involving “that which is at the 
‘bottom’, ‘on the ground’, or works from the ‘bottom-
up’”; it works on a smaller scale and is often associated 
with the ‘traditional’, ‘indigenous’, or ‘customary’.”. 
(Hirblinger and Simons 2015) This could set it up for 
marginalization; external actors have a tendency to assign 
“benign, but shallow characteristics to local 
communities.” (MacGinty 2015) This removes the 
agency from these communities and compacts what 
might be a complex or contradictory identity. Even 
worse, there is a danger that these communities can be 
used and even ‘commodified’ by these actors to 
legitimize their own agenda. MacGinty explains that as a 
result of this shift, discontinuities have arisen: the local is 
seen as problematic by being ‘underdeveloped’ and the 
source of conflicting identities, but also as a solution to 
its own problems through its ‘traditional wisdom’. This 
shows how the concept of ‘the local’ is “malleable and 
capable of being made and remade.” (MacGinty 2015) 
Thus, it seems it would be prudent for transitional justice 
actors to keep in mind the dangers of over-simplifying 
their understandings of the ‘local’, lest they romanticize 
and, in turn, abuse it. 
5. SITUATING LOCAL AND CENTRAL 
Now that we have come to a greater and more nuanced 
understanding of the local and central levels, we can try to 
situate each level in order to help us understand their 
relationship with transitional justice. 
While government is often considered to be the main 
actor at the central level, an actor’s ‘embeddedness’ in 
government does not necessarily exclude them from being 
a part of the local, particularly if they were legitimately 
elected. (Thoms et al 2010)) So-called ‘local’ leaders, in a 
conflict or early post-war situation; are said to 
“understand intimately the fear and suffering with which 
much of the population must live; they also have an expert 
knowledge of local politics and know on a face-to-face 
basis the local leaders of the government and its 
adversaries.” (Lederach 1997) Thus, it is possible that 
they can provide a unique input in regards to the needs of 
the greater society, particularly people who may otherwise 
be overlooked, such as victims, women, children, or 
minority groups. (Orentlicher 2007) That being said, local 
leaders can also be highly embedded in the conflict and 
thus be partial, which may in turn make them likely to 
favor ‘their’ group over another. (Hirblinger and Simons 
2015) While they may be generally considered as a part 
(or representation) of the local level, they may also 
perform tasks normally associated with the central level, 
for example creating governance structures or joining 
negotiations regarding the content peace agreements. 
(Arjona et al 2015) Thus, it is clear that the lines between 
the two are blurry, and actors’ behavior may be more 
telling than simply their title or the ‘space’ in which they 
are thought to be situated. 
6. CASE STUDY: NORTHERN IRELAND 
The police reforms in post-conflict Northern Ireland 
illustrate the tensions between the central and the local. 
The conflict in Northern Ireland was defined by 
conflicting identities and organized fighting between 
military and paramilitary organizations. To put it simply 
(recognizing the lack of nuance in this brief explanation), 
one side could be said to have been those in support of 
remaining a part of the UK (the Protestants/loyalists/
unionists), while the other side supported joining with the 
rest of the Republic of Ireland (the Catholics/republicans/
nationalists). (Ruane and Todd 1996) The latter perceived 
themselves to be victims of English colonization: robbed 
of their wealth and heritage. The former perceived 
themselves as constantly under threat of dispossession 
and loss of political control by the ‘native’ population. 
(Cochrane 2013) This all culminated from 1969 until the 
mid-1990s in a period of violence known as the Troubles, 
in which Northern Ireland found itself in a protracted 
conflict, plagued by continued segregation and a cycle of 
sectarian violence. (Knox 2002) 
As neither ‘side’ fully trusted the police force, 
paramilitaries took over policing with ‘vigilante justice’ 
in both crime control as well as social control; 
maintaining ‘community values’, and in turn, segregation 
between communities. (Steenkamp 2008) Thus it seems 
that while they may be seen as ‘locally-based’, 
paramilitary organizations during the Troubles assumed a 
kind of sub-central level by taking on the behaviors 
normally associated with the state, such as providing 
stability and protection, although in a way that seemed to 
have more local legitimacy than the ‘higher’ central level
—the British government. This legitimacy stemmed from 
group identification and was maintained through the 
paramilitaries’ methods of social control, as well as the 
services they provided for the communities they 
‘governed’. In addition to the perception problems 
already discussed, the police force was charged with 
allegations of human rights abuses and cooperation with 
loyalist paramilitary groups. In the transition, this led to a 
further lack of trust and acceptance of the police in the 
Catholic community, especially because the police 
seemed unable to address their past. (Lundy 2011) Thus, 
police reform was a major component of the 1998 Belfast 
Agreement, in the hope that increasing the legitimacy of 
the new police force would reduce the need for 
paramilitary policing. (Kempa et al 2002) The operational 
and command structure was changed, and its ‘image’ was 
altered through a change in name, uniforms, and ethos. 
Importantly, a successful quota-based recruitment system 
ensured that the police would be more representative of 
both communities. (Rolston 2013) Before the peace 
process, the police were seen as an ‘arm’ of the central 
level, aside from their alleged collusion with paramilitary 
organizations. After the Agreement, however, it seems 
that they began to become more legitimate and 
accountable to the communities in which they worked, 
shifting them closer to the ‘local’ level. 
During the conflict, the police force (working on the 
central level), was seen as illegitimate, allowing 
paramilitary organizations (made up of local-level actors) 
to take on policing roles (a behavior associated with the 
central level) while working within the local level. After 
the agreement, the reformed police force had to move 
into this in-between space in order to have legitimacy 
among the people but also be able to perform its duties. 
This illustrates how a binary understanding of the central 
and local levels is insufficient to understand how a 
certain actor operates during—and after—conflict. A 
romanticization of the local in this case might have 
perpetuated the exclusive and vigilante nature of the 
paramilitaries, and thus perpetuated the conflict. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to gain insight on the local and central 
levels, showing the difficulty in defining them and 
explaining the benefits and drawbacks that exist at each 
level. It also problematized the literature’s seemingly 
under-nuanced understanding of the local, and raised 
questions as to which actors might be considered to be 
local or central. It was found that these levels are much 
less distinct than some may expect, and that rather than 
conceiving of them spatially and statically, basing an 
understanding of them upon their actions will result in a 
more dynamic and nuanced awareness of these levels. 
When this is understood, transitional justice policies can 
be balanced and implemented more efficiently and in 
ways that will better serve the needs of perpetrators, 
victims, and the rest of the society. 
These conclusions are rather important due to the 
increasing employment of transitional justice theory and 
‘tools’ in post-conflict situations. As stated, the local level 
is increasingly prevalent in transitional justice literature, 
to a point where it has become romanticized. Without a 
nuanced and critical understanding of the local level—
which actors are included, what their needs are, and how 
they may be engaged—it might be abused. Consequently, 
the roots of the conflict will not be addressed and neither 
peace nor justice will be attained. 
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